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State Growth Empirics:  
The Long-Run Determinants of State Income Growth  




Real average U.S. per capita personal income growth over the last 65 years exceeded a 
remarkable 400 percent.  Also notable over this period is that the stark income 
differences across states have narrowed considerably: In 1939 the highest income state’s 
per capita personal income was 4.5 times the lowest, but by 1976 this ratio had fallen to 
less than 2 times.  Since 1976, the standard deviation of per capita incomes at the state 
level has actually risen, as some higher-income states have seen their income levels rise 
relative to the median of the states.  A better understanding of the sources of these 
relative growth performances should help to characterize more effective economic 
development strategies, if income growth differences are predictable.  In this paper, we 
look for statistically and economically significant growth factors by estimating an 
augmented growth model using a panel of the 48 contiguous states from 1939 to 2004.  
Specifically, we control for factors that previous researchers have argued were important: 
tax burdens, public infrastructure, size of private financial markets, rates of business 
failure, industry structure, climate, and knowledge stocks.  Our results, which are robust 
to a wide variety of perturbations to the model, are easily summarized: A state’s 
knowledge stocks (as measured by its stock of patents and its high school and college 
attainment rates) are the main factors explaining a state’s relative per capita personal 
income.I. Introduction 
Can states use economic development policy to boost the average personal 
income levels of their citizens?  This is certainly a major aim of most state economic 
development policies; yet neoclassical growth theory does not offer much hope of 
success for such policies.  It predicts that capital mobility alone will lead to fairly quick 
convergence in per capita personal incomes across U.S. states.  Unlike nations, U.S. 
states lack barriers to the flow of information, labor, and capital across boundaries that 
could preclude convergence (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991; 1992).  In fact, many 
researchers have noted that the tendency toward convergence over time in the per capita 
income of U.S. states supports the neoclassical view, at least when compared to the 
international results (Caselli and Coleman, 2001).   
However, this convergence is not complete, and it appears to have stalled since 
the mid 1970s (see the top left panel of Figure 1).  Many explanations have been offered 
for differences in economic performance at the state or metropolitan level.  Some 
researchers have focused on differences in tax policy (Easterly and Sergion, 1993; Mofidi 
and Stone, 1990; Phillips and Gross, 1990), others on varying rates of investment in 
public infrastructure (Aschauer, 1989; Evans and Karras, 1994; Wylie, 1996).  Still others 
have argued that past industry structure may aid or inhibit future economic development 
(Higgins, Levy, and Young, 2006).  For others, climate differences combined with the 
advent of affordable air conditioning play a prominent role (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
1991).  Other explanations center on financial markets and economic performance 
(Abrams et al., 1999; King and Levine, 1993; Levine, 1997; Montgomery and Wascher, 
1988; Rousseau and Wachtel, 1998).  Last, but certainly not least, many researchers have  
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focused on knowledge and technology.  Their explanation is based on the empirical 
observation that higher levels of per capita personal incomes are associated with greater 
knowledge stocks (Glaeser and Saiz, 2004).   By knowledge stocks we mean the 
accumulation of productive information in the form of education and technology.   
Because our results overwhelmingly support the knowledge-stock explanation, it 
is appropriate to review this literature more thoroughly.  Researchers have offered a 
variety of explanations for the mechanism underlying the positive statistical association 
between knowledge stocks and per capita personal incomes at the state level: (1) workers 
with more knowledge are more productive; (2) education and technology allow more 
people to be employed in high productivity jobs (Rangazas, 2005); (3) education and 
technology allow people to adapt in response to negative economic shocks; (4) education 
and technology make people more creative (Glaeser and Saiz, 2004); and (5) education 
and technology allow people to adopt new technology from other places (Benhabib and 
Speigel, 1994; Barro, 1997).   
  Education and technology constitute much of states’ knowledge stocks, and one 
might wonder why the greater levels of education and technology of some states does not 
dissipate to others, leading to a equalization of knowledge stocks. While some dissipation 
occurs, the diffusion across state borders is likely to be incomplete.  Migration of people 
is costly, and not all people will migrate even when entities in other states pay higher 
wages for their education (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991).  Also, knowledge spillovers 
appear to decrease with distance, making it harder for entities in other states to fully 
imitate the technology developed in a state (Griliches, 1979).  Furthermore, research 




2005).  Consequently, some portion of a state’s knowledge stock will remain in that state, 
and the larger knowledge stocks of some states will enhance their relative level of per 
capita personal income (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991).  
In order to investigate the effect of knowledge stocks and the other possible 
explanatory variables on per capita personal income, it is important to embed them within 
a growth model that allows for the convergence in per capita incomes due to the relative 
freedom of movement in capital and labor across state borders. So we embed a variety of 
state-specific labor augmenting factors into a standard neoclassical growth model.  This 
allows the state-specific component of the standard technology term to vary in a manner 
consistent with endogenous growth theory (see Romer, 1986).  As factors, we include 
measures of states’ knowledge stocks, along with other factors that have been argued to 
explain per capital personal income levels—public finance, business environment, and 
meteorological climate.  We find that our empirical results are driven by our three 
measures of a state’s stock of knowledge: the proportion of the population with at least a 
high school degree, the proportion of the state’s population with at least a bachelor’s 
degree, and the stock of patents held by people or businesses in the state.    
This paper incorporates a couple of advances on the previous literature in this area.  
First, we examine a longer time period than previous researchers, exploring differences in 
relative levels of per capita income among the 48 contiguous states from 1939 to 1999.  
The longer time frame gives us greater statistical precision, allowing us to tease out the 
effects of factors that have weaker effects on relative per capita income growth, and that 




Second, we control for all classes of variables that previous researchers have 
argued affect relative per capita income levels across states, including a state’s tax burden, 
its investments in public infrastructure, the size of its private financial markets, its rate of 
business failure, its industry structure, and its climate (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991; 
Glaeser and Saiz, 2004; Caselli and Coleman, 2001; Kim, 1998). By including variables 
that account for a wide range of alternative explanations, we can estimate the magnitude 
of the effect that investments in knowledge will have relative to investments in the other 
factors that affect income growth. We can also mitigate the imprecision of these estimates 
of investment effects that stems from omitted variable bias.   
In a study as ambitious as this one, it is important to thoroughly explore the 
robustness of our findings.   Of particular concern is the possible endogeneity of most of 
the explanatory variables.  For example, a problem with many efforts to associate 
international differences in knowledge stocks and levels of per capita personal income is 
the endogeneity of education outcomes (Bils and Klenow, 2000).  An exogenous factor 
might make the level of per capita personal income in some states higher than other states.  
Those states might use that extra income to consume more knowledge.  As a result, 
knowledge stocks and per capita personal income could be positively correlated without 
knowledge stocks directly causing one state’s per capita personal income to be higher 
than another’s.  We test for predetermination of the explanatory variables using 
instruments based on lags of differing duration and show that a five-year lag removes 
(statistically) the threat of endogeneity.   
Under all perturbations, we find that the knowledge variables play the main role 




statistical significance dominate the other explanatory variables.  Moreover, within the 
set of knowledge factors, we find that investments in technology, as measured by the 
stock of patents, play the largest role in explaining the differences in per capita personal 
incomes across states. 
The paper proceeds as follows:  The next section presents our modified growth 
model.  The third section describes the data and the variables.  The fourth section 
presents our results.  The final section concludes. 
 
II.  Model 
 
Growth theory strives to explain how an economy’s output, investment, and 
employment evolves in the long run.  Solow (1956) provided a major advance to the field 
by focusing the analysis on the production function associated with current technology.  
Along with diminishing marginal returns to capital, introducing capital mobility implies a 
strong underlying tendency for income convergence through capital equalization.  A 
shortcoming of his approach is that technological innovation, the Solow residual, enters 
the model exogenously.  Romer (1986) pointed out that the development of innovations 
usually requires some diversion of productive resources away from current consumption, 
indicating that technological innovation is endogenous.   
We take Romer’s (1986) critique of growth theory to heart by including in our 
model measurable factors that might enter into the aggregate production function of that 
state. These factors do not reveal the actual process of resource diversion but can reveal 




embed a variety of labor-augmenting factors into a standard neoclassical growth model, 
allowing the state-specific component of the standard technology term to vary.  
At any given time t, the income (Yt,s) of state s is assumed to follow a Cobb-
Douglas function of its capital (Kt,s) and labor (Lt,s). 
(
α − γ α =
1
t s , t s , t s , t s , t A X L K Y )
                                                
 (1) 
The equation also contains the familiar labor-augmenting rate of productivity growth in 
the national economy (At), which accounts for all increases in labor-augmenting 
productivity including the average of any state-specific labor-augmenting factors at time 
t.  State-specific labor augmenting factors Xt,s, allow for relative differences in the state-
varying factors.  Without the addition of these state-specific factors, this equation is 
completely standard in the international income convergence literature (Islam, 1995).
1  
Although Islam and others have accounted for human capital differences in a similar 
manner, we can do so with greater precision because we have a longer time period and 
we can control for more factors.  The data available for U.S. states are richer than what is 
available internationally, allowing us to examine a wider set of factors.
2   
Specifically, we examine a set of factors that might offer a production benefit, 
such as human capital or public infrastructure, and that are either a characteristic of the 
resident workforce or that are more available to that workforce than to other workforces.  
By construction, the aggregate productivity level (At) will capture the average effect over 
all 48 states of all such production amenities, while the state factors are measured relative 
 
1 For ease of exposition in the development of our model, we treat X as a single factor.  It is straightforward, 
but more tedious, to reformulate our exposition by modeling X as a log-linear function of multiple factors, 
Z. 
2 More factors could be considered with a shorter period, but we believe that the longer period is more 
desirable because it provides more reliable estimates of  the effects.  Higgins, Levy, and Young (2006) 




to the overall average and thus have a mean of one.  This construction makes the 
estimation of the X variable a between-state estimator of the full effects in cases where 
the X variable is likely to have general as well as relative effects. 
In our baseline model, we also control for one factor that is not typically thought 
to be labor augmenting: climate. A favorable climate could be a local amenity that boosts 
productivity and thus incomes.  Alternatively, a climate considered favorable by residents 
might make them willing to accept a lower income rather than relocate.   
There are other variables that we would have liked to have included in the model 
but that are unobserved.  These missing variables could bias our results if they are 
correlated with the variables we include.  As part of our efforts to explore the robustness 
of our results, we also employ a fixed effects estimator.  This estimation approach 
controls for unobserved fixed-state effects, thus providing a powerful cross check of our 
findings. 
U.S. states have few barriers to capital mobility, and this should speed their 
income convergence.
3  If we make the assumptions typical of the growth literature (see 
Islam, 1995), solve for the steady-state equilibrium, and allow for dynamic adjustment 
toward this steady-state equilibrium, we can obtain the following reduced-form equation, 
s , t t 3 s , t 2 s , t 1 o s , t D X ln y ln ) y ln( υ + β + β + β + β = τ − τ −    (2) 
where  is a set of T-1 time dummies, which capture all the national trends (in 
particular, inflation, technological progress, and the average effect of the X variable.)  
t D
                                                 
3 Income differences might be also countered by labor mobility, although relative housing costs and 
regional preferences might cause net flows to cease before labor mobility can offset the value of local 
amenities (Roback, 1982).  Also, if the quality of the local workforce is the productive amenity (or dis-




The key feature of this equation is that it allows for the estimation of the state-specific 
effects jointly with the underlying convergence process.  The existence of a labor-
augmenting factor (Xt,s) introduces the possibility of persistently higher (or lower) per 
capita incomes.  The literature on income convergence has varied on the functional form 
of the estimates, but most of the cross-sectional or panel results can be transformed to be 
similar to our estimation.  Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) estimate the relationship non-
linearly in order to focus on the adjustment parameter, but taking the log of their 
specification results in an algebraically equivalent form.  β convergence, when the partial 
correlation between growth in income over time and its initial level is negative, is implied 
in our estimates when β1 is less than 1.  Islam (1995) raises the possibility of conditional 
convergence which adds a set of state-specific dummy variables to equation 2.  We will 
consider this approach as an alternative to our baseline.   
A critical issue to consider is the potential for X endogenously responding with 
the income level.  If the X variable is exogenous, there is no need to use a lagged value as 
an instrument; just set τ = 0.  However, international growth studies clearly find problems 
with treating the likely X variables as exogenous (see, for example, Bils and Klenow, 
2000).  Current values of the X variables are likely to be a function of any difference in 
the states’ past levels of the same X, realized current income, and some expectation of 
relative future income prospects of the region (represented below as a linear function of 
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At some lag τ, however, it is likely that future errors (or innovations),  are 
uncertain enough that they no longer alter the realizations of the X variables τ years.  If X 
is predetermined in this sense at a τ-year lag, then the future value of the X variables is 
simplified: 
 
s , t υ
s , t s , t t s , t y ln X ln a ) X (ln E τ − τ − τ − ϕ + φ + =     (3’) 
The second equality follows because for E(Xt,s) to be zero by construction, the expected 
innovation (vt,s) will be zero for an appropriate a.  We do not assume predetermination of 
the X variables; instead, we test whether this condition holds.  Predetermined X variables 
allows for consistent and efficient estimation of (2) using OLS.      
While we can learn several key aspects of the relevance of state-level regressors on 
income levels from the regression shown in equation (2), accounting for the correlation 
with the other variables in the model is necessary to estimate the effects of these 
explanatory variables on income convergence across states.  In Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1991) terms, this evaluates the role of the variables in state-level σ convergence, when 
the dispersion of real per capita income across a group of economies falls over time.  
Taking the standard deviation of both sides of equation (2) and focusing on the X 
variables results in the following relationship, 
        (4)  () . X ln ˆ , D ˆ y ln ˆ ˆ cov 2
) X ln ˆ var( ) D ˆ y ln ˆ ˆ var( ) y ˆ var(ln
s , t 2 t 3 s , t 1 o
s , t 2 t 3 s , t 1 o s , t
τ − τ −
τ − τ −
β β + β + β +
β + β + β + β =
We have every reason to suspect that the covariance in equation (4) will not be zero and 




We will present many of our results in terms of the variance with and without 
particular components of X.  For example, to estimate how much of the variation can be 
explained we exclude all of the X variables by setting their values to zero: 
()
() s , t 2 t 3 s , t 1 o
s , t 2
t 3 s , t 1 o
s , t 2 t 3 s , t 1 o
s , t 2 t 3 s , t 1 o s , t s , t s , t
X ln ˆ , D ˆ y ln ˆ ˆ cov 2
) X ln ˆ var(
) D ˆ y ln ˆ ˆ var(
X ln ˆ , D ˆ y ln ˆ ˆ cov 2
) X ln ˆ var( ) D ˆ y ln ˆ ˆ var( ) 0 X ln y ˆ var(ln ) y ˆ var(ln
τ − τ −
τ −
τ −
τ − τ −
τ − τ − τ −
β β + β + β +
β =
β + β + β −
β β + β + β +
β + β + β + β = = −
 (5) 
This approach summarizes both the direct effect of the X variables on expected income 
variation and the effects of covariation between X and income levels.  In the results 
section, we report a variety of estimates of the standard deviations (the square root of the 
variance), which are calculated by zeroing out selected regressors, in order to illustrate 
their estimated effect on per capita personal income convergence. 
 
III.  Data 
 
In this section we describe the data we collected to estimate our growth model, 
focusing on  the motivation, source, and construction of the regressors we employ.  One 
of our goals is to extend the sample back as far as possible so that we can study the long-
run evolution of state per capita personal incomes.  We also include explanatory variables 
that previous researchers have argued are important.  The larger sample should increase 
the statistical precision of our results, enabling us to tease out even weak effects.  




should be able to sort out how much each factor drives state per capita personal income, 
and mitigate bias from omitted variables.  
Collecting a data set like this is very challenging.  Some of our variables go 
farther back than others, and the historical series for the variables vary by state.  The 
banking data turned out to be the limiting factor in our data set, as deposit information by 
state only goes back to 1934.  As our baseline model has five-year lags, this means our 
first observations are from 1939.  Our last observations are from 2004, which means we 
have per capita personal income from that year, but for the lagged explanatory variables 
values are from 1999.  Data availability also led us to consider only 48 contiguous states 
because data for Alaska, Hawaii, and the District of Columbia are incomplete.  Because 
we omit the years in between the five-year periods in order to avoid artificially 
underestimating the standard errors,
4 we are left with a panel of 48 states over 14 five-
year periods.  Although this approach may seem drastic because it tosses away 
observations that could be retained if the time series properties of the errors were 
modeled explicitly, the approach has the advantage of being more flexible.  In addition, 
because our educational attainment data are only available decennially from 1940 to 1980, 
(details to come), we are not really discarding as much information as it appears.  Thus, 
our approach is appropriately conservative.  
Our measure of a state’s economic performance is per capita personal income, 
and the dependent variable is constructed by taking the natural log of the ratio of the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis’s personal income series and the Census Bureau’s 
population estimate for a given state at time t.   
                                                 




We will now describe the set of regressors we employ to estimate the model.  The 
first two types are mainly control variables—they are not the focus of our study, but they 
need to be included in order to obtain consistent estimates of the coefficients of the 
factors in which we are interested.  First, we include a lagged dependent variable because 
equation (2) calls for it in order to capture the dynamic adjustment process.  Second, we 
include year-time dummies, which capture the national movements in prices and also the 
average effects across states of movements in technology.  They also pick up any other 
national trends that might be in the data.   
We include a variety of explanatory variables that might alter convergence rates 
across states.  All of these regressors are transformed as the natural log of the state’s 
value at a given time, divided by the population-weighted average for all of the states in 
the sample.  Thus, the average effect for a particular untransformed variable is captured 
by the year dummies, while the regressor captures that variable’s relative effect.   
As discussed earlier, we include several classes of variables that might influence a 
state’s rate of convergence.  A key class of variables we call knowledge variables.  These 
variables seek to measure a state’s stock of knowledge.  Two of these variables measure 
educational attainment.  The first is the proportion of a state’s population with at least a 
high school degree  The other is the proportion with at least a bachelor’s degree.  For 
1979-2004 our source for these data is the annual Current Population Survey.  For prior 
years, decennial data are available from the Census Bureau, which we interpolate as 
required for intermediate years.  Because educational attainment moves only slowly over 





Our other knowledge variable is a state’s stock of patents.  This variable proxies 
for a state’s ability to innovate new products and production techniques that could give it 
an economic edge and lead to higher relative per capita personal incomes.  A state with a 
larger stock of patents is presumed to be more innovative in creating new products and 
production techniques.  Patent data by state are available in the Annual Report of the 
Commissioner of Patents and USPTO for the years 1917 to 2001.  To calculate our stock 
variable we employ a perpetual-inventory approach.  To estimate the initial stock for a 
given state, we take the average number of patents issued from 1917 to 1919 and divide 
by an assumed depreciation rate.  For subsequent years, a given year’s stock is equal to 
the previous year’s stock times the depreciation rate plus the number of patents issued in 
that year.   
Our baseline model assumes a 5 percent depreciation rate.  Faster assumed 
depreciation rates make the initial stock estimates less important.  With a 5 percent 
depreciation rate, only 46 percent of the initial stocks are left in each state’s patent stock 
in 1934, the first lag used.  The assumed depreciation rate does not appear to be critical 
because we obtain very similar results for a wide range of depreciation rates (1 percent to 
100 percent).   
Public finance—the way in which states raise and spend tax revenue—is widely 
thought to influence a state’s economic performance, and it comprises another set of 
explanatory variables.  Many analysts focus on tax rates (Mofidi and Stone, 1990; 
Phillips and Gross, 1995).  Therefore, we include a measure of tax rates.  Our tax rate 
variable is a state’s total tax revenue (from Financial Statistics of States) net of severance 




of Energy) over the state’s personal income.  We need to emphasize that this variable is 
not the tax rate on labor.  It is a measure of a state’s overall tax burden, but it does not 
control for how those taxes are actually levied, which could be important. 
Other researchers have argued that expenditures on public infrastructure are an 
important growth factor (Aschauer, 1990; Wylie, 1996).  Thus, we include a measure of 
infrastructure expenditures.  Our proxy for public capital, highway capital, is constructed 
using a perpetual-inventory approach.  Our measure of highway spending comes from the 
Financial Statistics of States.  The data become available for states in various years from 
1917 to 1925.  The initial stock for a state is calculated as the average of that state’s first 
three years of observations divided by the assumed rate of depreciation.  In our baseline 
model, we set depreciation equal to 5 percent, but, as with patent stocks, our results are 
robust over a wide range of values. 
Our last set of explanatory variables describes a state’s business environment.  
Some researchers think that the extent of private financial markets within the states 
influences their economic performance (Abrams et al, 1999).  Our measure of private 
financial markets within the states is based on the amount of dollars in bank deposits, 
which is available from the FDIC’s Summary of Deposit series after 1966.  For prior 
years, we spliced in Call Report data for domestic deposits.  An alternative interpretation 
of this variable is that it is a proxy for a state’s private capital stock. 
Some analysts think that economic dynamism influences economic performance 
(Montgomery and Washer, 1988).  We capture dynamism with a measure of business 




the total number of business concerns in the state.  The ultimate source for these data is 
the Statistical Abstract of the United States and the Metropolitan Area Databook.
5   
Over time, the desirability of different industries may have changed, yet states can 
not adjust their industry make-up instantaneously, or without cost.  The industry structure 
factors control for a state’s previous economic makeup, specifically the composition of 
its sector specific capital and worker's human capital.  Industry structure is measured as 
the shares of a state’s personal income derived from manufacturing, farming, and mining, 
respectively.  Implicitly, a state low in all of these industry structure variables will have a 
relatively large serviced sector.   
We also control for a state’s meteorological climate as measured by heating-
degree days, cooling-degree days, and inches of precipitation.  These data are available 
from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.  Because they are annual 
averages from 1929 to 2003, they are constant over time. 
Some insight can be gained by looking at the raw variables.  Table 1 presents the 
values of per capita personal income and the various explanatory variables for the first 
and last observations for each state (1939 and 2004 data for personal income and 1934 
and 1999 data, because of the lag, for the explanatory variables).  Population grew in 
every state except North Dakota over this period, and every state experienced rapid 
growth in its per capita personal incomes.  Among our knowledge-stock variables, both 
high school and college attainment have increased dramatically, while patents per capita 
have remained relatively flat.  Some researchers have noted that the value of patents may 
have changed over time (see Griliches, 1990).  Any inflation or deflation of the quality of 
                                                 




patents over time will be filtered out because the patent variable in the model is relative 
to the average of these states. 
Among the other classes of explanatory variables, tax rates (tax revenue over 
personal income) rose over this period, but not as dramatically as highway capital.  By 
contrast, failure rates rose slightly, but as we will see in a moment, this masks a great deal 
of volatility over time.  Bank deposits actually fell substantially over this period because 
of disintermediation.  Savers have many more options today over where to put their funds, 
such as money market accounts and mutual funds.  One thing is very clear from Table 1: 
there is a wide range of variation in most of these variables across states even though they 
tend to follow the same general trends.   
Further insights can be gleaned by plotting the raw data.  Figure 1(a) plots the 
course of the standard deviation of our dependent variable (the natural log of real per 
capita personal income) from 1934 to 2004.  These standard deviations are a measure of 
how much per capita personal incomes vary across states in each year.  After a slight 
downward trend in the late 1930s, there was a rapid surge towards convergence during 
World War II (WWII).  Following the end of the war, convergence slowed but continued 
to decline at a steady pace through the late 1970s.  Since 1970, convergence has basically 
leveled off.   
Figures 1(b-d) are similar plots for the explanatory variables.  The convergence in 
high school attainment (high school+) has been remarkable, falling about 80 percent.  In 
contrast, there has been almost no convergence in college attainment (college+).  It is 
worth knowing how the levels of these variables have moved overall.  Figure 2(a) plots 




population had at least a high school degree in 1934, but by the end of our sample, well 
over 80 percent had achieved this level of education.  Gains in this variable have sharply 
leveled off in recent years.  As for college education, in 1934 less than 4 percent of the 
population had at least a bachelor’s degree, but, by 1999, this figure had risen to 25 
percent.  Unlike high school attainment, gains in college attainment, which accelerated 
around 1970, show no sign of easing.  Currently, while there are no outliers for high 
school attainment (defined as more than two standard deviations from the mean), 
Arkansas and West Virginia are both negative outliers for college attainment.   
For patents, our other knowledge variable, the spread across states narrowed 
about 25 percent over this period.  Delaware is the only positive outlier for the patents 
variable, and no state is a negative outlier.  In Figure 2(b), we see that per capita patents 
fell sharply during WWII but recovered in the late 1940s and held at the 1940s level 
through the mid-1970s.  Since 1980, patents per capita have risen sharply and have 
accelerated since 1997. 
Our business-failure rate is fairly volatile over time.  However, it shows no more 
tendency toward convergence than do our variables for tax rate, highway capital, or bank 
deposits.  Interestingly, the variable with the smallest standard deviations over time is the 
tax rate variable, which has been fairly stable over the last 30 years.   
There has been more movement in the industry-structure measures.  
Manufacturing’s standard deviation has fallen by a about a third over this period.  
Although historically there have been many large outliers for manufacturing, at present, 
no state deviates from the mean by more than 2 standard deviations.  Mining’s standard 




been a big positive outlier in mining through the mid-1970s, but is no longer one.  Only 
Wyoming is currently more than 2 standard deviations above the mean.  In sharp contrast 
to the other two measures of industry structure, farming’s standard deviation has actually 
diverged by about a fifth.  The positive outliers with this variable are Nebraska, North 
Dakota, and South Dakota.  Large negative outliers are Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and 
West Virginia. 
 
IV.  Results 
In this section we discuss our baseline estimates.  We then explore how robust our 
estimates are to alternative assumptions.  Finally, we take a closer look at the results by 
looking at state-specific estimates. 
 
Endogeneity and Lags 
The baseline model assumes that the parameters are fixed over time and that a 5-
year lag is sufficient to handle any endogeneity of the explanatory variables.  
Contemporaneous observations of the explanatory variables are likely to be endogenous, 
so employing them would lead to biased and inconsistent estimates.  Using instrumental 
variables can provide consistent estimates of the model’s parameters, and lagged values 
make good instruments.  We use the same lag length for the lag of the dependent variable, 
even though the motivation for this lag stems from the partial adjustment process.     
The key to the instrumental-variable approach is to find instruments that are 
highly correlated with the regressors, yet are uncorrelated with the error term.  Lagged 




lag be?  A longer lag makes it more likely that the possible endogeneity is removed but 
lowers the correlation between the lag and the instrumented variable.  Also, assuming a 
longer lag effectively reduces the number of observations available for analysis.   
Intuition suggests a 5-year lag is a reasonable value to balance these trade-offs.  
Of course, this assumption needs to be tested, and we do this using the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman (D-W-H) test (see Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman, 2003), which can be used to 
test whether a regressor, or subset of regressors, is endogenous.  The test compares an 
estimator that is consistent, whether or not the subset of variables is predetermined, with 
an estimator that is consistent and more statistically efficient only if the set of variables is 
predetermined.   
Table 2 reports D-W-H test results for various lag lengths for the regressors taken 
as a group and then for each one individually.  For our always-consistent estimator, we 
employ 10-year lags as instruments.  The estimator that is consistent only if the subset of 
variables is predetermined employs the specified lag.  Note that as the lag length varies, 
the data employed to calculate the tests change for two reasons.  First, changing the lag 
length necessarily shifts the associations among the variables.  The second reason is more 
subtle: increasing the lag length trims the number of observations, whereas trimming the 
lag length increases the number of observations.   
With lag lengths less than 5 years, the null hypotheses that the variables are 
predetermined are soundly rejected at the 5 percent confidence level.  For 5-year lags, the 
null is accepted for the joint test and for each explanatory variable individually—
although this is a very close call with the tax-rate variable.  While a 6-year lag is even 




rejected.  Thus, when seeking a balance between handling endogeneity with sample size, 
we find that a 5-year lag is the best choice. 
 
Baseline Results 
Our baseline estimates, calculated from a panel OLS estimator, are reported in 
Table 3, column 1.  Conventional measures of model fit are high enough to be irrelevant 
(R
2 = 0.9983), primarily due to the importance of the time dummies and the lagged 
dependent variables in fitting the level of incomes.  A model with only these variables 
generates an R
2 of 0.9976.  A more informative measure of the goodness of fit is how 
much of 2004’s relative personal per capita incomes are explained by our posited growth 
factors.  The correlation between the actual and fitted values is fairly high (0.78), 
suggesting that the model explains about 78 percent of this variation. 
From the perspective of state income differences, a more informative comparison 
can be made between the standard deviation of the estimates implied by the model and 
the actual income differences across states over time.   Figure 3 shows the standard 
deviation of the predicted and actual log per capita income levels.  Although the high R
2 
does not convert into perfect predictions of the path of income convergence, the fit is 
quite good, except for the initial sharp decline in income differences, which is 
underpredicted in the model. 
Some understanding of the determinants of income growth can be gained by 
looking at the estimated parameters.  The estimated coefficient on lagged logged per 
capita income is less than one (0.67).  Because state per capita personal income is 




things equal, this rate of convergence would halve the standard deviation of per capita 
incomes in just 10 years. In 30 years, it would be less than a tenth of its starting value.  In 
the model with no other explanatory variables than the time dummies, the coefficient on 
lagged per capita personal income is estimated to be 0.85, more than doubling the 
estimated number of years needed to achieve similar levels of convergence.   
Implicitly, the difference in the coefficient on lagged per capita personal income 
between the two models (one with all the explanatory variables and the other with only 
the lagged dependent variable and the time dummies) reveals that state-level differences 
in the X variables have significantly reduced the amount of income convergence that has 
been realized, even though most of these variables have experienced some convergence 
across states as well.  In other words, convergence would be faster if all states realized 
the same values for the explanatory variables.  We now consider each of these factors in 
turn. 
  
Knowledge Variables  
All of the coefficients of the knowledge variables (high school+, college+, and 
patent stocks) have the expected sign and are statistically significant.  Each plays a role in 
enabling some states to achieve and maintain higher per capita personal income relative 
to other states.  Other things being equal, being one standard deviation above the states’ 
average in the percentage of the population that has graduated from high school (a 20 
percentage point increase) leads to 1.5 percent higher per capita personal income.  Thus, 
the sharp rise of high school attainment in the sample is estimated to account for a 




to be small.  In 1999 (the lag used for 2004), high school attainment for these states 
averaged 83.3 percent.  Even so, there remains a fairly wide range of achievement rates.  
West Virginia has the lowest rate of high school attainment at 75.1 percent, while 
Washington’s stands at 91.2 percent. 
Similarly, we find a positive and statistically significant effect for the log of the 
deviation from the states’ average in the percent of the population that are college 
graduates.  Other things being equal, a one–standard-deviation increase above the states’ 
average in the percentage of the population that has graduated from college (23 
percentage points higher) leads to 1.4 percent higher per capita personal income.  There is 
more room for improvement in college attainment than high school attainment: The 
states’ average of this rate stood at 25.2 percent in 1999, and the rates of individual states 
vary from a low of 17.3 percent (Arkansas) to a high of 38.7 percent (Colorado).  
Our patent-stock variable measures a different dimension of knowledge, a state’s 
ability to innovate new products and production techniques.  Other things being equal, a 
one-standard-deviation increase above the states’ average in the stock of patents per 
capita (75 percentage points higher) leads to 3.0 percent higher per capita personal 
income.  This is a large effect, and it is also relatively tightly estimated with a t-statistic 
of over 6.  While the spread of the patent variable has narrowed by about half over time, 
from a factor of about 30 in 1934 to about 15 in 1999, the range is still very wide. 
Figure 4 compares the implied effects of the knowledge variables on the standard 
deviations in the baseline model.  Each line is the standard deviation of the predicted 
effect for the indicated variable.  For comparative purposes, the figure also includes the 




not the lagged dependent variable or time dummies).  These estimates can either offset or 
amplify one another. Clearly, some of the effects are offsetting as the standard deviation 
of all variables is not much higher than just the patent effect alone.  Finally, note that 
because of the decline in the variation across states of high school attainment the role of 
this factor declines noticeably over time, while differences in college attainment are more 
persistent, and end up being more important than the high school effect.  
 
Industry Structure 
Of the industry-structure variables, only manufacturing and farming’s are ever 
statistically significant (see Table 3, column 1).  The share of personal income derived 
from manufacturing has the clearest effect on relative per capita income—lowering 
expected current income levels relative to past income levels.  Although income levels 
are relatively high in states that specialize in manufacturing at the start of the sample, 
these states either shift out of manufacturing or experience relatively weak income gains.  
Indeed, having a one-standard-deviation-higher share of manufacturing income (a 58 
percent higher share than the states’ average) lowers expected income growth by 2 
percent, which is, again, an important difference.   
Mining is also a statistically significant and negative factor, although its 
coefficient is far smaller.  A one-standard-deviation increase in the mining share (a 142 
percent larger share of income derived from mining than the states’ average) lowers 
average income 1.1 percent.  Farming is an insignificant factor, which might be 




Figure 5 reveals that for explaining income differences, only the manufacturing 
effect has anywhere near the magnitude of the knowledge variables, and then it is only 
about the size of the educational attainment variables.  Over time, as manufacturing 
levels have converged across states, the manufacturing effect explains less of the 
variation in income levels.  The effect of mining on income differences is much smaller 
and is relatively unchanged over time.  Farming has essentially no effect.  
 
Climate 
By design, the climate variables are constant over time.  We find a statistically 
significant relationship for the cooling days and precipitation variables.  States with a 
one-standard-deviation increase in log cooling days relative to the nation (about a 75 
percent increase) have 1 percent higher income.  Similarly, those with a one–standard-
deviation-lower rate of precipitation (about a 50 percent reduction) have about 1 percent 
higher income.     
 
Other Variables 
The public finance variables do not have much explanatory power.  The 
coefficient on highway capital, our proxy for public capital, is small and not statistically 
significant.  Even if the coefficient were doubled, the effect of a one-standard-deviation 
increase in relative infrastructure spending would still be less than one-half of a 
percentage point.  The story is similar for our tax variable.  Its coefficient is also small 
and statistically insignificant.  Again, its effect would remain small even if its coefficient 




Our business-environment variables also add little explanatory power.  The 
coefficient on the failure rate of businesses, our measure of Schumpeterian creative 
destruction, is positive as anticipated, but not statistically significant.  It also accounts for 
only a very small amount of the standard deviation in the dependent variable.  Finally, the 
story for the bank-deposits variable, our proxy for private capital and the size of a state’s 
financial markets, is again similar.  Its coefficient is small and statistically insignificant, 
as is its estimated standard deviation.  This is broadly consistent with the literature, which 
reports little effect of state banking activity on states’ per capita income growth (see 
McPherson and Waller, 2000). 
 
Explanatory Variables and Interstate Income Differences 
Each of our explanatory variables could either increase or decrease income 
differences across states, depending on the correlation between the effect of the variable 
and income levels in the states.  In order to assess the effects of the statistically 
significant variables, we perform a series of counterfactual experiments, each of which 
involves setting a different set of explanatory variables to zero. Rerunning the regression 
then allows us to calculate the fraction of the variation in state incomes which the set of 
variables set to zero explains.   
In Figure 6 we plot the resulting shares of variation explained by the major effects.  
The patents variable consistently explains the largest share of the standard deviations in 
our dependent variable.  The next-largest share is the combined effect of the educational 




of the education variables is a result of the declining differences in high school attainment 
across states discussed earlier. 
The other explanatory variables account for relatively small shares of the 
explained variation across states.  The magnitudes of the effects of the industry-structure 
variables are smaller, but they have increased over time.  Of these variables, the 
manufacturing variable has the largest role. As its coefficient is negative, a greater share 
of manufacturing can be interpreted as exerting a drag on state per capita personal income.  
Given the high incomes in manufacturing states in the 1940s, the effect of this factor has 
been to reduce income levels below what would have been.  However, since the early 
1970s manufacturing intensity has been essentially uncorrelated with income. 
Of the climate variables, both the cooling and precipitation variables are 
statistically significant.  Both have a positive effect on per capita personal income.  Even 
so, the magnitudes of the estimated effects of these variables are small. 
 
Estimating the Model under Alternative Assumptions 
In this section, we describe how our results vary as we estimate the model under 
different distributional assumptions, allow the model’s parameters to differ over time, 
change the lag lengths used in the estimation, and alter the depreciation rates used in 
constructing the stock variables.  Under all these perturbations, our central finding 
remains the same: The knowledge variables, particularly patents, are the key to 






Controlling for Possible Fixed Effects 
While we have made every effort to include all the relevant explanatory variables, 
there are certainly some we would have liked to have included but could not because the 
data were not available.  If these omitted variables matter and are also correlated with our 
included variables, then our baseline results would be inconsistent estimates of the 
coefficients.  To explore the potential for the adverse effects of omitted variables, we use 
a fixed effects panel estimator, which can consistently estimate the time-varying 
regressors even when there are omitted time-invariant regressors.   
The fixed-effect-parameter estimates are reported in the second column of Table 3.  
Note that the climate variables, being constant over time, are stripped out of the model, as 
are any unobserved time-constant variables that this technique is designed to handle.  The 
estimates do differ some from the baseline estimates, and the state fixed effects 
coefficients are jointly statistically significant at the 1 percent confidence level even 
though none of the individual state dummy coefficients is (even at the 5 percent 
confidence level).  In fact, the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients of the knowledge 
variables all increase and remain statistically significant.
6  For the other explanatory 
variables, the results change very little, with only manufacturing’s share of personal 
income losing its statistical significance.   
The climate variables appear to have more explanatory power than the state 
dummies.  If the dummy variables for four states are excluded from the model, the 
climate variables can be reintroduced to the model.  By selecting four states with similar 
                                                 
6 If dummies for the four Census regions (Northeast, Midwest, South, and West) are included instead of the 
state fixed effects, their coefficients turn out to be statistically insignificant from zero.  These coefficients 
become statistically significant if the climate variables are also omitted from the regression.  Again,, the 




climate variables and small estimated state dummies (Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, 
and South Carolina), the remaining state dummies are centered about zero.  An F-test for 
the statistical significance of the remaining state dummies cannot be rejected at the 95 
percent confidence level.  In any case, if you believe the fixed effects estimator should be 
the preferred one, our core findings remain unchanged. 
Figure 7 illustrates the share of the standard deviation of per capita personal 
income explained by the fixed effects results.  The time paths of the various effects are 
largely unchanged.  The main observable shift from Figure 6 (aside from the flat-lined 
climate effect) is that the effect of patents is a bit lower over time.  The effect of industry 
structure is also more muted.  In short, allowing for fixed effects does not materially alter 
our story, suggesting that our results are not an artifact of omitted variable bias. 
 
Allowing the Coefficients to Vary over Time  
Our next perturbation of the model is to allow the coefficients of the explanatory 
variables to vary over time.  Over a period this long, it could be argued that the 
underlying parameters have changed over time, either due to changes in technology or 
changes in political institutions.  In order to determine if our results are sensitive to these 
underlying parameter changes, we estimate a version of the model that allows the 
parameters to vary over three periods within our sample, 1939 to1959, 1964 to 1979, and 
1984 to 2004.  With our 5-year lag, the first and last periods each have 5 cross sections 
while the second has only four.  In this version of the model, to hold the dynamic 
structure of the model constant, we do not allow the coefficient of the lagged dependent 




The parameter estimates of this model are presented in Table 3, columns 3 to 5.  
This permutation yields some larger changes.  The patent effect, if anything, becomes 
more important, at least in the early years of the sample.  While the coefficient of the 
patents variable is statistically significant in all three periods, its magnitude in the earliest 
period, 0.0749, is twice as large as it is in the two latter periods, 0.0415 and 0.0376, and 
is only slightly lower than the baseline model’s 0.0404.  An F-test for whether these 
coefficients are all equal cannot be rejected at the 95 percent confidence level (p-value 
0.0556). 
Allowing the coefficients to vary over time shifted the education variables even 
more.  The college+ variable (0.0577 in the baseline model) ranged from 0.0275 in the 
middle period to 0.0753 in the last period—the only period in which the variable was 
statistically significant.  Not surprisingly given the relatively large standard errors, an F-
test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are the same in all three periods. 
The high school+ variable (0.0781 in the baseline model) also dipped from 0.0671 
in the first period to 0.0241 in the middle period but rebounded to 0.0739 in the last 
period.  Note that it was not statistically significant in any of the periods, and again the 
null hypothesis that the three coefficients are the same cannot be rejected.  The 
magnitudes of these coefficients are similar to those in the baseline model, but their 
statistical precision is adversely affected by having fewer time series observations to 
estimate them with. 
The tax-rate variable, the business-failure-rate variable, and the banking-deposits 
variable, like their baseline counterparts, are all statistically insignificant.  In contrast, our 




two. Even so, the magnitude for this variable remains fairly small even in the period in 
which it is significant. 
Among the industry-structure variables, manufacturing’s share of personal 
income remains a negative influence in all three time periods, but is statistically 
significant in only the first and last periods.  The magnitude ranges from -0.0228 to -
0.0339, roughly the same as the baseline model’s magnitude of -0.034.  Mining’s share 
also is estimated to exert a negative influence, the same as in the baseline model.  Finally, 
the coefficient on farming’s share remained essentially zero.   
The parameter estimates of the climate variables appear to suffer from the same 
lack of statistical precision that the education variables do.  The magnitude of the 
parameters is essentially the same, but the coefficient estimates are not statistically 
significant. 
The effects of the time-varying-parameter estimates are plotted in Figure 8.  The 
main observable shift from Figure 6 is that the effect of patents is now estimated to 
decline over time.  The major part of this decline is due to the fact that patents explain a 
much larger share of the standard deviation at the beginning of the sample.  Another 
change is that the share of the standard deviation explained by education is a bit flatter 
over time in the time-varying parameter model than in the baseline model.  A big change 
from the baseline results (Figure 6) is that the effect of industry structure is now slightly 
larger in magnitude than the education variables.  Finally, the climate variables explain a 
relatively small share of the standard deviation, as in the baseline results.  In short, this 
robustness test reveals that the factors driving a state’s per capita personal income remain 





Varying the Lag Length  
Another way to test the robustness of our findings is to vary the lag length.  
Qualitatively, our results remain the same whether the lag length is shortened to one or 
stretched to 20.  The sixth column of Table 3 reports the parameter estimates when the 
lag length is set to 10 (other results can be obtained from the authors).  The main change 
is that the coefficients for the knowledge variables are both larger in magnitude and 
statistical significance than in the baseline model.  Once again, although there is some 
shift in the magnitude and trends, patents and educational attainment are still the main 
drivers of state per capita personal incomes (see Figure 9). 
 
Varying Rates of Depreciation 
A final set of robustness tests varied the rate of depreciation used in constructing 
the patents and highway capital stock measures.  The results are even more robust across 
this dimension.  Even increasing the depreciation rate to 100 percent, effectively turning 
these stock variables into flows, yielded largely the same parameter estimates (see last 
column of table 3 ), and the same knowledge variables explain the bulk of the variation in 
per capita personal incomes across states (see Figure 10).  The time paths are more 
volatile in this figure because the patents and highway variables are not inherently 






V.  A Closer Look at States 
More insight into how per capita personal income evolves can be gained by 
looking at individual states.  A couple basic facts are illustrated in Figures 11 and 12, 
which plot the observed relative per capita incomes across states for 1939 and 2004, 
respectively.  First, these plots show in more detail than Figure 1 how much state per 
capita personal incomes have converged.  Much of the convergence comes from states at 
the lower end of the distribution moving up toward the average.  In 1939, states ranged 
from less than -0.8 log point to more than 0.6 log point away from the overall average.  In 
sharp contrast, the range for 2004 was only from a little less than -0.2 to under 0.4.  Also, 
while some states have improved their relative position and some have lost ground, there 
appears to be a great deal of persistence in relative per capita personal incomes.  This 
persistence makes it much less likely that the remaining wide range of outcomes is due 
primarily to random shocks.  In other words, there is a role for factors other than 
convergence to explain this variation.  
Figures 13 and 14 plot the predicted effects of our explanatory variables for 1939 
and 2004, respectively.  In both periods, high-performing states have large patent stock 
and educational attainment effects, while for low-performing ones these effects are large 
and negative.  Industry structure and all the other explanatory effects play relatively 
minor roles.  In particular, education plays a much larger role in 1939, when high school 
attainment varied much more across states.  For example, Mississippi trailed all other 
states in both periods in per capita personal income, but while it has not managed to 
reduce the drag from its relatively low stock of patents, by 2004 it had substantially 




on the other hand, is a high-income state in both periods.  In 1939, its higher levels of 
personal income were driven by a relatively high stock of patents, but in 2004 its 
relatively high level of educational attainment also played a significant role. 
While effects predicted for a given period are of interest, they do not reflect the 
full impact of the explanatory variables over time, because previous values exert an 
indirect effect through the lagged value of per capita personal income.  For example, a 
high level of the educational attainment regressor in one period not only leads to a higher 
level of per capita personal income in that period, but some of it is propagated into future 
periods through the lagged coefficient.  An explanatory variable’s total effect on per 
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Note that because the lagged coefficient on per capita income ( ) is less than one (see 
Table 3), a given   has a diminishing effect on future per capita personal incomes the 
further into the future one goes. 
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The estimated cumulative effects for our baseline and fixed effects estimators are 
plotted in Figures 15 and 16.  There are differences in the estimates for individual states, 
but the overall cumulative effects are very similar for the two techniques.   The estimated 
effects are particularly close for the patent-stock and educational-attainment effects.  
Most of the differences come from industry-structure and other effects.  This is not too 
surprising because although the coefficients on manufacturing and mining are statistically 
significant in the baseline model, none of the industry-structure coefficients are 




estimated effects are likely to contain a lot of noise.   Also, because the effects of the 
climate variables are included in the “other” category in the baseline results but not in the 
fixed effects results (time-invariant climate variables are removed by the fixed effects 
estimator) the baseline and fixed effects estimates of the other effects are likely to differ. 
Looking at only Figures 13 and 14, one might get the impression that while states 
may be able to influence their relative position, their ability is somewhat limited.  After 
all, the best and worst states only affect their relative per capita personal incomes by less 
than 10 percent.  However, one gets a very different impression by looking at the 
estimated cumulative effects.  In 2004, the estimated cumulative effects account for about 
half of the differences across states on average in relative per capita personal incomes. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
  Neoclassical growth theory suggests that the per capita personal income of 
residents of the U.S. states should converge over time given the absence of barriers to the 
flow of information, labor, and capital across state boundaries.  However, as Figure 1(a) 
illustrates, convergence of per capita personal income levels across U.S. states is not 
complete and appears to have stalled since the mid 1970s.  After constructing a Romer-
type endogenous growth model by taking a standard Solow growth model and 
introducing state-specific labor-augmenting factors in order to control for the underlying 
convergence process, we find that a state’s productive stock of knowledge appears to 
enhance its relative level of per capita income.  
To examine the differences in relative levels of per capita income among the 48 




researchers have argued influence relative per capita income levels across states: tax 
burdens, public infrastructure, size of private financial markets, rates of business failure, 
industry structure, and climate.  We find that our three measures of a state’s knowledge 
stock (the proportion of the population with at least a high school degree, the proportion 
of the state’s population with at least a bachelor’s degree, and the stock of patents held by 
people or businesses in the state) matter most.   We find that these effects are robust to a 
wide variety of perturbations to the model.  Other things equal, being one standard 
deviation above the states’ average in the stock of patents per capita (75 percent higher) 
leads to 3.0 percent higher per capita personal income.  Similarly, being one standard 
deviation above the states’ average in high school attainment (a 20 percentage point 
increase) leads to 1.5 percent higher per capita personal income.   Finally, being one 
standard deviation above the states’ average in college attainment (23 percentage points 
higher) leads to 1.4 percent higher per capita personal income.  
Our results are easily summarized: A state’s stock of knowledge is the main factor 
explaining its relative level of per capita personal income.  If state policymakers want to 
improve their state’s economic performance, then they should concentrate on effective 
ways of boosting their stock of knowledge.  Of course, further research will be needed to 





Abrams, B., Clarke, M., and Settle, R. 1999.  “The Impact of Banking and Fiscal Policies 
on State-level Economic Growth,” Southern Economic Journal, 66(2): 367-378. 
Aschauer, D. 1989.  “Is Public Expenditure Productive?”  Journal of Monetary 
Economics, 24: 171-188. 
Barro, R., and Sala-i-Martin, X. 1991.  “Convergence across States and Regions,” 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1: 107-182. 
Barro, R., and Sala-i-Martin, X. 1995.  Economic Growth. (New York, McGraw-Hill) 
Barro, R. 1997. Macroeconomics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Baum, Christopher, Schaffer, Mark, and Stillman, Stephen. 2003. “Instrumental 
Variables and GMM: Estimation and Testing,” Stata Journal, 3(1), 1-31.  
Benhabib, J., and Speigel, M. 1994. “The Role of Human Capital in Economic Development: 
Evidence from Aggregate Cross-country Data,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 34(2) 
143-174. 
Bosworth, Barry and Collins, Susan. 2003. “The Empirics of Growth: An Update,” Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity. 2:2003, 133-206. 
Bils, M., and Klenow, P. 2000. “Does Schooling Cause Growth?” The American Economic 
Review, 90(5): 1160-1183. 
Easterly, W. and Sergio, R. 1993. “Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth,” Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 32, 417-458. 
Evans, P. and Karras, G. 1994. “Are Government Activities Productive? Evidence from a 
Panel of US States,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 76, 1-11. 
Caselli, F., and Coleman, W. 2001. “The U.S. Structural Transformation and Regional 
Convergence: A Reinterpretation,”  Journal of Political Economy, 100(3): 584-
616 
Glaeser, E., and Saiz, A. 2004. “The Rise of the Skilled City,” Brookings-Wharton Papers on 
Urban Affairs, 47-105. 
Griliches, Z. 1979. “Issues in Assessing the Contribution of Research and Development 
to Productivity Growth,” Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1): 92-116. 
Griliches, Z. 1990. “Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey,” Journal of 
Economic Literature, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Dec.), 1661-1707. 
McPherson, Sandra Hanson and Waller Christopher J. 2000 “Do Local Banks Matter for 




Macroeconomics, Gregory Hess and Eric van Wincoop, eds., Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge. 
Higgins, Matthew J., Levy, Daniel, and Young, Andrew T. 2006. “Growth and Convergence 
Across the U.S.: Evidence from County-Level Data,” forthcoming in the Review of 
Economics and Statistics. 
Islam, Nazrul 1995. “Growth Empirics: A Panel Data Approach,” The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 110(4): 1127-1170. 
Kim, S. 1998. “Economic Integration and Convergence: U.S. regions, 1840-1987,” 
Journal of Economic History, 58(3): 659-683. 
King, R., and Levine, R. 1993.  “Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might be Right,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(3): 717-738. 
Kocherlakota, Narayana and Yi, Kei-Mu.  1997. “Is There Endogenous Long-Run Growth?  
Evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom,” Journal of Money, Credit 
and Banking. 29(2), 235-260.   
Levine, R. 1997.  “Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda,”  Journal 
of Economic Literature, 35(2): 688-726. 
Mofidi, A., and Stone, J. 1990. “Do State and Local Taxes Affect Economic Growth?” Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 72(4): 686-691. 
Montgomery, E., and Washer, W. 1988.  “Creative Destruction and the Behavior of Productivity 
over the Business Cycle,”  The Review of Economics and Statistics, 79(1): 168-172. 
Phillips, J., and Goss, E. 1995.  “The Effect of State and Local Taxes on Economic 
Development: A Meta Analysis,” Southern Economic Journal, 62(2): 320-333. 
Rangazas, P. 2005. “Human Capital and Growth: An Alternative Accounting,” Topics in 
Macroeconomics, 5(1): 1-43. 
Roback, Jennifer. 1982. “Wages, Rents, and the Quality of Life,” Journal of Political 
Economy, December, v. 90( 6) , pp. 1257-78. 
Romer, Paul. 1986.  “Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth,” Journal of Political 
Economy, December, v. 94(5), pp. 1002-35. 
Rousseau, P.L. and P. Wachtel. 1998.  ”Financial Intermediation and Economic Performance: 
Historical Evidence from Five Industrialized Countries,” Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking, 30, 657-678. 




Solow, Robert. 1956. “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth,” The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, volume 70, 65-94.  
Voices and Choices website, http://www.voiceschoices.org/
Wylie, P. 1996.  “Infrastructure and Canadian Economic Growth, 1946-1991.”  The Canadian 





























































































































































































































1940 1960 1980 2000
Year
Log Per Capita Income Model Prediction















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(Log Per Capita Income Relative to State Average)





























































































































(Log Per Capita Income Relative to State Average)

































































































































(Log Per Capita Income Relative to State Average)


































































































































(Log Per Capita Income Relative to State Average)















































































































































































































































































 Table 1:  Values of Selected Variables             
                  
State  Population (000)   Personal Income (real per capita)   Patents (per capita)  High School+ (percent) College+  (percent) 
   1934  1999  1934  2005  1934  1999  1934  1999  1934  1999 
Alabama      2,685       4,430                  2,220                 25,352   0.053  0.091  13.1  81.1  2.5  21.8 
Arizona         428       5,024                  3,789                 26,241   0.114  0.298  24.8  83.1  5.7  24.2 
Arkansas      1,878       2,652                  1,953                 23,602   0.024  0.071  12.1  78.9  1.8  17.3 
California      6,060     33,499                  6,254                 32,285   0.440  0.501  34.7  80.4  8.5  27.1 
Colorado      1,075       4,226                  3,874                 33,095   0.224  0.429  26.5  90.4  4.9  38.7 
Connecticut      1,650       3,386                  6,862                 41,766   0.818  0.530  19.4  83.7  3.9  33.5 
Delaware         250          775                  6,798                 32,605   0.848  0.538  18.7  84.5  4.2  24.0 
Florida      1,585     15,759                  3,629                 28,855   0.146  0.165  22.0  82.7  4.2  21.6 
Georgia      2,964       8,046                  2,561                 27,292   0.048  0.164  15.6  80.7  2.8  21.5 
Idaho         473       1,276                  4,237                 24,567   0.070  0.959  25.3  84.8  3.9  20.8 
Illinois      7,772     12,359                  5,304                 31,833   0.559  0.302  19.6  85.4  3.8  25.6 
Indiana      3,319       6,045                  3,778                 27,611   0.367  0.238  19.7  82.9  3.1  18.4 
Iowa      2,510       2,918                  2,828                 28,402   0.148  0.255  24.2  89.7  3.7  21.7 
Kansas      1,868       2,678                  2,999                 28,436   0.094  0.162  23.1  87.6  3.8  26.5 
Kentucky      2,722       4,018                  2,455                 24,911   0.061  0.113  12.6  78.2  2.5  19.8 
Louisiana      2,202       4,461                  2,764                 24,999   0.047  0.108  15.5  78.3  2.9  20.7 
Maine         829       1,267                  4,376                 27,520   0.107  0.096  24.4  88.9  2.6  22.9 
Maryland      1,710       5,255                  5,443                 36,303   0.291  0.287  16.1  84.7  3.8  34.7 
Massachusetts      4,305       6,317                  6,414                 38,645   0.519  0.557  25.2  85.1  4.6  31.0 
Michigan      4,798       9,897                  4,760                 29,404   0.478  0.372  20.1  85.5  3.4  21.3 
Minnesota      2,695       4,873                  3,767                 33,184   0.210  0.544  20.3  91.1  3.5  32.0 
Mississippi      2,050       2,828                  1,825                 22,362   0.015  0.066  9.6  78.0  2.6  19.2 
Missouri      3,784       5,562                  3,863                 27,948   0.230  0.167  18.3  85.0  3.4  23.0 
Montana         545          898                  3,831                 25,357   0.090  0.140  24.5  88.8  4.2  24.0 
Nebraska      1,382       1,705                  2,721                 29,576   0.101  0.112  24.0  89.3  3.8  20.4 
Nevada          98       1,935                  5,688                 30,990   0.133  0.152  29.1  86.4  6.0  20.2 
New Hampshire         480       1,222                  5,005                 33,626   0.304  0.533  22.0  86.5  3.5  27.2 
New Jersey      4,089       8,360                  6,019                 38,224   0.778  0.477  17.6  87.4  4.2  30.5 
New Mexico         461       1,808                  2,593                 23,976   0.037  0.187  18.6  80.9  3.5  24.5  
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Table 1:  Values of Selected Variables (continued)             
                  
State  Population (000)   Personal Income (real per capita)   Patents (per capita)  High School+ (percent) College+  (percent) 
   1934  1999  1934  2005  1934  1999  1934  1999  1934  1999 
New York    13,253     18,883                  7,129                 35,039   0.581  0.324  17.8  81.9  4.6  26.9 
North Carolina      3,304       7,949                  2,657                 26,862   0.044  0.218  17.7  79.8  3.6  23.9 
North Dakota         672          644                  1,910                 26,726   0.046  0.104  18.5  84.9  3.0  22.3 
Ohio      6,751     11,335                  4,781                 28,560   0.558  0.296  20.8  86.1  3.8  25.5 
Oklahoma      2,391       3,437                  2,625                 25,498   0.102  0.144  20.1  83.5  4.0  23.7 
Oregon         985       3,394                  4,621                 28,058   0.214  0.323  28.1  86.2  4.8  26.8 
Pennsylvania      9,795     12,264                  5,069                 30,512   0.357  0.306  16.5  86.1  3.6  23.9 
Rhode Island         675       1,040                  6,297                 31,350   0.410  0.251  16.5  80.9  3.8  26.8 
South Carolina      1,760       3,975                  2,209                 24,889   0.026  0.141  17.9  78.6  4.3  20.9 
South Dakota         682          750                  1,942                 28,073   0.067  0.088  20.5  88.7  3.2  25.6 
Tennessee      2,784       5,639                  2,572                 27,356   0.078  0.152  14.9  79.1  2.6  17.7 
Texas      6,053     20,558                  3,042                 28,160   0.099  0.294  21.7  78.2  3.7  24.4 
Utah         522       2,203                  3,266                 24,376   0.121  0.308  30.8  91.0  5.4  27.9 
Vermont         357          605                  4,013                 29,098   0.157  0.562  23.2  89.3  3.4  28.3 
Virginia      2,485       7,000                  3,340                 33,063   0.093  0.149  18.0  87.3  3.6  31.6 
Washington      1,610       5,843                  4,642                 32,080   0.232  0.313  28.3  91.2  4.7  28.6 
West Virginia      1,771       1,812                  3,298                 23,575   0.088  0.082  14.4  75.1  2.9  17.9 
Wisconsin      3,054       5,333                  3,991                 29,418   0.383  0.314  17.3  86.8  3.2  23.6 
Wyoming         233          492                  4,290                 31,386   0.150  0.106  27.9  90.7  4.2  22.3 
Average      2,621       5,763                  3,965                 29,230        0.233        0.273            20.6            84.5         3.8         24.6  
                  
*The GDP price deflator, base year=2000, was used to calculate real values.           
 Table  1  (continued)            
              
State  Tax Rate (proportion)  Highway Capital (real per capita) 
Business Failure Rate 
(proportion)  Bank Deposits (real per capita) 
   1934  1999  1934  1999  1934  1999  1934  1999 
Alabama  0.0474  0.0594                   655                 1,387   0.00335  0.00416                9,690               11,800 
Arizona  0.0721  0.0624                1,070                 1,373   0.00102  0.00835              42,625                 7,666 
Arkansas  0.0606  0.0820                2,139                 1,568   0.00335  0.00580                8,381               11,466 
California  0.0365  0.0724                   399                    606   0.01002  0.01232              43,235                 9,051 
Colorado  0.0473  0.0507                   601                 1,199   0.00523  0.00920              21,957                 9,501 
Connecticut  0.0334  0.0741                   513                 2,041   0.01017  0.00260              29,148               15,344 
Delaware  0.0606  0.0906                1,317                 2,868   0.00159  0.00091              33,401               68,013 
Florida  0.0512  0.0560                   665                 1,320   0.00267  0.00240              39,266               11,043 
Georgia  0.0431  0.0588                   709                 1,531   0.00300  0.00216              11,980               10,723 
Idaho  0.0425  0.0745                   742                 1,912   0.00310  0.00489              14,768                 7,289 
Illinois  0.0255  0.0568                   689                 1,468   0.00566  0.00698              22,777               15,372 
Indiana  0.0478  0.0629                   438                 1,342   0.00337  0.00133              16,581               10,032 
Iowa  0.0645  0.0664                   740                 2,256   0.00331  0.00107              13,817               13,161 
Kansas  0.0462  0.0647                1,680                 2,156   0.00198  0.01042              13,996               11,628 
Kentucky  0.0550  0.0785                   442                 2,318   0.00226  0.00128              10,080               11,627 
Louisiana  0.0666  0.0625                   853                 1,863   0.00175  0.00386              15,686                 9,586 
Maine  0.0554  0.0819                   824                 1,444   0.00676  0.00316              13,376               10,102 
Maryland  0.0328  0.0569                   509                 1,291   0.00606  0.00621              20,641                 9,578 
Massachusetts  0.0279  0.0681                   252                 1,962   0.00960  0.00324              25,733               20,174 
Michigan  0.0493  0.0785                   476                    925   0.00393  0.00365              20,198                 9,780 
Minnesota  0.0526  0.0851                   953                 1,468   0.00459  0.01081              18,582               13,657 
Mississippi  0.0480  0.0803                   397                 1,776   0.00343  0.00276                8,388                 9,827 
Missouri  0.0335  0.0599                1,112                 1,442   0.00331  0.00552              15,740               12,751 
Montana  0.0408  0.0656                   824                 3,299   0.00442  0.00552              15,456                 8,923 
Nebraska  0.0442  0.0590                   811                 2,352   0.00562  0.00400              12,749               14,638 
Nevada  0.0552  0.0602                3,971                 1,538   0.00261  0.01201              62,158                 8,237 
New Hampshire  0.0467  0.0288                   407                 1,332   0.00324  0.00451              26,508               15,034 
New Jersey  0.0381  0.0575                   908                 1,674   0.00956  0.00434              19,924               14,244 
New Mexico  0.0665  0.0837                1,142                 1,868   0.00146  0.00759              17,588                 6,929  
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Table  1  (continued)            
              
State  Tax Rate (proportion)  Highway Capital (real per capita) 
Business Failure Rate 
(proportion)  Bank Deposits (real per capita) 
   1934  1999  1934  1999  1934  1999  1934  1999 
New York  0.0303  0.0625                   365                 1,302   0.01188  0.00520              46,101               20,627 
North Carolina  0.0582  0.0710                   473                 1,403   0.00364  0.00310              10,050               12,719 
North Dakota  0.0600  0.0674                   442                 2,767   0.00150  0.00581              12,448               14,570 
Ohio  0.0335  0.0597                   253                 1,295   0.00571  0.00595              14,735               11,534 
Oklahoma  0.0579  0.0671                   887                 1,554   0.00350  0.00580              13,024                 9,721 
Oregon  0.0528  0.0589                1,138                 1,381   0.01012  0.00771              21,993                 7,793 
Pennsylvania  0.0392  0.0630                   352                 1,196   0.00415  0.00535              16,667               12,946 
Rhode Island  0.0312  0.0663                   550                 1,937   0.01356  0.00274              27,278               11,930 
South Carolina  0.0588  0.0672                   874                 1,145   0.00246  0.00359                6,503                 7,742 
South Dakota  0.0838  0.0472                   850                 3,001   0.00214  0.01011              11,897               15,727 
Tennessee  0.0445  0.0513                1,133                 1,701   0.00473  0.00497              13,483               11,784 
Texas  0.0533  0.0463                   933                 1,359   0.00263  0.00733              23,024                 9,064 
Utah  0.0708  0.0738                   673                 1,908   0.00809  0.00271              19,917                 8,632 
Vermont  0.0665  0.0887                1,893                 1,600   0.00342  0.00156              16,786               11,549 
Virginia  0.0464  0.0565                   894                 1,807   0.00517  0.00396              15,261               10,522 
Washington  0.0538  0.0699                   805                 1,520   0.00784  0.00695              23,265                 9,218 
West Virginia  0.0496  0.0838                   607                 2,968   0.00656  0.00558                8,791               11,414 
Wisconsin  0.0513  0.0803                   918                 1,108   0.00539  0.00501              15,475               12,454 
Wyoming  0.0520  0.0474                2,326                 5,655   0.00327  0.00719              19,695               12,861 
 Average         0.0497         0.0660                   888                 1,796         0.00484         0.00524              20,017               12,708 
              



















1       0.000        0.000       0.000       0.000 
 
0.000       0.076       0.000 
2       0.000        0.331       0.002       0.000 
 
0.000       0.330       0.007 
3       0.000        0.621       0.000       0.005 
 
0.001       0.205       0.458 
4       0.002        0.009       0.297       0.034 
 
0.003       0.734       0.112 
5       0.149        0.583       0.181       0.118 
 
0.145       0.553       0.121 
6       0.369        0.041       0.779       0.341 
 
0.765       0.940       0.540 
7       0.161        0.141       0.057       0.390 
 
0.799       0.819       0.371 
8       0.768        0.899       0.735       0.150 
 






Table 3: Regression results 
  Baseline  Fixed Effect  Time   Varying   Parameters  Baseline Baseline 
  Lag=5 Lag=5 1939-1959  1964-1979  1984-2004  Lag=10  100%  Depreciation 
Lagged Income  0.673 0.557 0.630 0.630 0.630  0.434  0.665 
  (31.06)** (21.43)** (25.35)** (25.35)** (25.35)**  (13.29)**  (28.95)** 
Manufacturing  -0.0224 0.0110  -0.00573  -0.0214 -0.0344  -0.0336  -0.0312 
  Share  (-3.21)** (0.91)  (-0.57) (-1.47) (-2.47)** (-3.08)** (-4.25)** 
Farm Share  -0.00452 -0.00961 -0.0109  0.00269  -0.00638  -0.00896  -0.00566 
  (-1.51) (-1.68) (-1.37) (0.45) (-1.57)  (-1.84)  (-1.91) 
Mining Share  -0.00477 0.00744  -0.00173 -0.00965 -0.0108  -0.00731  -0.00392 
  (-2.23)* (1.37)  (-0.57)  (-2.10)* (-2.48)*  (-2.20)*  (-1.84)* 
Heating Days  0.00944 na  -0.0177  -0.00439  0.0202  0.0205  0.0248 
  (1.01)   (-0.92)  (-0.24)  (1.42)  (1.36)  (2.84)** 
Cooling Days  0.0135 na  0.0167  0.00831  0.107  0.0236  0.0140 
  (2.33)*   (1.60)  (0.73)  (1.16)  (2.55)*  (2.43)* 
Precipitation  0.201 na  -0.0143  -0.00679  0.0340  0.0323  0.0291 
  (2.11)*   (-0.69) (-0.33) (2.27)*  (2.10)*  (3.01)** 
High School+  0.0744 0.0824 0.0670 0.0244 0.0378  0.120  0.103 
  (3.08)** (2.31)*  (1.87)  (0.42)  (0.46)  (3.18)**  (4.26)** 
College+  0.0624 0.109  0.0278 0.0264 0.0959  0.103  0.0497 
  (3.61)** (3.78)** (0.83)  (0.78)  (3.19)**  (3.75)**  (2.80)** 
Stock   0.0405 0.0560 0.0751 0.0417 0.0367  0.0619  0.0323 
  of Patents  (6.17)** (4.39)** (5.64)** (3.37)** (3.63)**  (5.88)**  (5.30)** 
Business Failure Rate  0.00304 -0.00400  0.00259 0.0128  0.00567  0.00320  0.00112 
  (0.76) (-0.89)  (0.36) (1.55) (0.81)  (0.48)  (0.28) 
Tax Rate  -0.0155 -0.0106 -0.0174 -0.0360 -0.0233  -0.0194  -0.0163 
  (-1.35) (-0.63) (-0.86) (-1.69) (-1.13)  (-1.08)  (-1.42) 
Highway Capital  0.00880  0.0215 0.0341 0.0137 -0.00915 0.00449  -0.00458 
  (1.05) (1.69) (2.81)*  (0.71) (-0.54)  (0.35)  (-0.74) 
Banking   -0.00590 -0.0136  -0.0195  -0.00381 -0.00557  -0.00222  0.00739 
   Deposits  (-0.064) (-0.98)  (-1.01) (-0.19) (-0.63) (-0.15)  (0.83) 
Observations  672 672   672   336  672 
R-squared  
 
0.998 0.998   0.998   0.998  0.998 
Value of t statistics in parentheses   
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%    